

## KAMPUNG AND STATE: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN COMMUNITY IN YOGYAKARTA

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The Malay word *kampung* originally meant "compound," but it has developed several meanings through the centuries. In Malaysia it commonly denotes "village" or rural settlement but in Indonesia is more often applied to urban areas. For most urban Javanese, however, it evokes "home community." This article examines a relationship between *kampung* administrative units and *kampung* communities, as observed in the city of Yogyakarta.

Today, the administrative entities are officially styled "*rukun kampung*" (RK) (*rukun* meaning "harmonious"). The communities are simply "*kampung*" to their members. My conception of a relationship between two entities is rejected by local administrators and *kampung* members alike. Both parties insist that only *one* object is involved: a *communal* entity. In fact, the RK is officially defined as a community. Yogyakarta officials do not question that definition, nor do *kampung* people, who view all RK government structures as community possessions. Nevertheless, two objects can be distinguished: one a *de facto* organ of the modern Indonesian state, the other a traditional communal form. The local rejection of this distinction seems to be largely the result of a state-engineered misconception.

Inquiries in the city suggest that each RK there is closely related to a *kampung* community. The tie is curious, not merely because of the fundamental differences in the two objects but also because of state efforts to disguise it. The relationship forms the hub of this discussion, which seeks to show how the state sustains traditional communality as a means of facilitating administration.

Because both objects are apparently products of long development processes, an attempt will be made to trace the history of *kampung* in Yogyakarta. This is easier to do for the administrative forms than it is for *kampung* communities. The only data on bygone communities come from a few oblique references by local historians and the recollections of older residents, neither of which take us back past the 1920s. Still, those data, and other information gleaned from participant observation in contemporary *kampung*, permit a few tenable inferences regarding earlier communities.

Field research for this study, which formed the basis of a doctoral dissertation, was carried out between 1975 and 1979. For sixteen months during those five years, I lived with my family in one RK-*kampung* setting, and studied the fourteen RK of the surrounding *kecamatan* (municipal subdistrict). That subdistrict is in the heart of the city and, in late 1979, housed 25,600 of the city's 374,000 people on its 99 hectares. It is one of the oldest and most densely populated sections of Yogyakarta. The 1979 data are now rather old, but since the key objects had undergone no substantial changes in the preceding thirty-five years, the text should give a fair account of the present situation.

### *Kampung Administrative Entities*

A peculiar facet of the discussion is the fact that, except for a brief period (1944-45) during the Japanese Occupation, no government has acknowledged kampung as administrative units proper. Indonesian governments have been the most explicit, consistently legislating that these entities are in no sense *political*: that they are *social-communal* organs, not units of the civil-administrative apparatus. Earlier authorities omitted kampung from specifications of their administrative systems. This is intriguing, as kampung have always featured in the city's organization and have been ascribed definite state-political functions since the city's first years.

The Yogyakarta Sultanate was established in 1755. Its first ruler, Hamengku Buwono I, laid out his realm according to time-honored principles. It was conceived as a series of concentric circles, each reflecting a degree of spiritual-political power. At their hub was the ultimate power source: the monarch, embraced by his court and palace (*kraton*). Encompassing the palace was a "circle" of lesser power: the *nogoro* or capital city (in fact, a roughly rectangular area of 1,135 hectares). Outside the capital lay the bulk of the kingdom: the *nagaragung*, a "circle" of yet lesser potency which equated with the Sultanate's agricultural production zone.<sup>1</sup>

As was the practice in other Asian cities, the *nogoro* population was ordered into small groups, each headed by an individual accountable for the behavior of the group.<sup>2</sup> The groups were established in functional rather than spatial terms. Each represented a specific profession, occupation, ethnic grouping, or the like. In Yogyakarta, these entities were called kampung. There were three broad types:<sup>3</sup>

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1. Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968). Until 1831 there was another "circle" (the *monconogoro* or "outer state") comprising land on Java's north coast. That was annexed by the Dutch following the 1825-30 Java War. (M. C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java* [London: Oxford University Press, 1974]).

2. Japan and China followed such policies for more than a millennium. In Tokugawa Japan, for example, populations in all districts were broken down ultimately into five-household units (*goningumi*) for effective administration. (T. Yazaki, *Social Change and the City in Japan* [Tokyo: Japan Publications, 1968], pp. 111, 455.) After the Meiji Restoration, these very small units lapsed in rural areas but were retained in the towns and cities, where they are still used. (Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* [London: Routledge, 1967], pp. 57-58.)

3. The typology is based on details from several sources, notably Dipodiningrat, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan Kotapradja Jogjakarta," in *Kota Jogjakarta 200 Tahun*, ed. Darmosugito, Dipodiningrat, Notojoedo, et al. (Yogyakarta: Panitia-Peringatan Kota Jogjakarta 200 Tahun, 1956); Darmosugito, "Sedjarah Kota Jogjakarta," in *ibid.*; and Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta*. The early diversity of kampung is reflected in the names of present-day RK. Bugisan, Wirobrajan, Surakarsan, and Demangan are named for military units; Notoyurajan, Bintaran, and Notoyudan are named for princes and *patuh*; Sutodirjan, Wirogunan, and Sosrodipuran for nobles and high court officials. Other names include Gandekan--the place of the *Gandek* or Court Herald; Pajeksan--the place of the *jaksa*

1. The residential and official compounds of princes and high nobles. These held the realm's highest administrators, and other dignitaries (with or without administrative functions) confined by the Sultan to his capital to prevent them from building rural power bases and contesting his rule.<sup>4</sup>

2. Various foreign quarters for colonialists, non-Javanese subjects, foreign traders, emissaries, and visitors. Thus, there were separate kampung for Dutch, Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and so on.

3. The quarters of diverse occupational groups: various classes of artisans, laborers, gardeners, artists, soldiers, holy men, lamplighters, ostlers, scribes, and so on.

The three categories overlap in broader functional terms. For example, Types 1 and 2 serve clear political functions. They contain central power-wielders and others (local nobles and foreigners) located close to the epicenter to facilitate palace surveillance and, as far as possible, control and/or protection of their members. The prime function of Type 3 kampung was to serve the diverse spiritual-physical needs of the more eminent urbanites.

The kampung pattern represents an extension of the kraton, an ordered adjunct of the power center. In this capacity, the nogoro was the receptacle for those things which had to be within easy reach of the ruler but which could not be contained within his palace, and kampung were the smaller compartments ordering the receptacle's contents.

But the kampung were not identified as administrative units. The reason is fairly straightforward and can be reduced to a matter of form. In the Javanese world, administration was a professional bureaucratic function carried out by appointed officers of the palace.<sup>5</sup> Kampung did not produce tax revenue, hence could neither support nor warrant their own paid administrators. Only the rural nagaragung received such attention. It was divided into appanages (*lungguh*), each broken down into smaller sections (*kabekelan*) in which *bekel* gathered taxes for their appanage-holders (*patuh*). The *bekel* were effectively state-appointed, remunerated for their services, and invested with definite police and administrative powers. Thus, their *kabekelan* (in a sense, the rural counterparts of kampung) were readily identified units of the kingdom's administrative structure.<sup>6</sup>

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or Prosecutors; *Sitisewu*--the place of officials from the Ministry of Lands--*Kanayakan Sitisewu*. Then there are the names such as *Dagen* (the area of the woodworkers--*undagi*); *Jlagran* (the area of the stonemasons--*jlogro*); and *Siliran* (the place of the lamplighters--the *silir*).

4. This practice was prudent, given the relative ease with which usurpers could legitimize claims to the throne. Anderson highlights the general problem in his study of Javanese conceptions of power. He shows how military victory is transformed into legitimate rule when the new Prince grasps the *pusaka* (sacred heirlooms and visible trappings of rule), demonstrates possession of *wahyu* (the "light" of sovereignty) and, by extension, *kasekten* (political power in the traditional Javanese sense). See B. R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Claire Holt, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

5. Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, p. 112; B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, vol. 1 (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1955).

6. See Selo Soemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta*, pp. 31-32; Hubertus Johannes

Though not self-sustaining, kampung were self-administering. The state required them to have leaders who would bear responsibility for civic order in their small areas. It was these people, primarily, who were expected to secure the trouble-free functioning of the capital. Yet the state offered no explicit guidelines on their selection or terms of office. In many kampung, this presented no serious problems since their populations already had unquestioned leadership due to the nature of the associated group: e.g., palace ministries, military commands, noble households, and the like. Among other elite local and foreign groupings, where claims to leadership were more tenuous, it is not clear what selection methods would have been followed. With the humbler support groupings, it is reasonably assumed that the traditional *musawarat lan mupakat* was much practiced. The expression, which translates as "discussion and consensus," denotes a process in which seemingly unanimous decisions are made after protracted periods of informal discussion.<sup>7</sup> This was to become the general mode of selection for the city's kampung, and variants are in use today, in conjunction with conventional balloting.

The urban administrative system remained unchanged until the second decade of this century, despite vast social changes within the region. It survived the period of British overlordship, the Java Wars, the "Culture System," Dutch acquisition of appanages, and a steady decline in palace power through the reigns of seven Sultans.

In 1912, the Dutch Government approved the abolition of appanages, reformed land laws, and revised the civil-administrative system. In Yogyakarta, the concomitant changes in government took several years to complete.<sup>8</sup> Kampung were now identified as *territorial-residential* not *functional* units. In 1918, the first specifically *urban* offices were inaugurated within the state system proper: a town administrator (*wedono kota*) with two assistants (*assisten wedono*), one for the northern half of the city (*Tugu*), the other for the south (*Kraton*). Below these officers were the kampung leaders, now styled *kepala kampung* ("kampung head").

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van Mook, "Kuta Gede," in *The Indonesian Town: Studies in Urban Sociology*, ed. W. F. Wertheim (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), p. 304.

7. Variants are found in other Southeast Asian societies, but Soetardjo describes the practice as "the original Indonesian democracy" (*Demokrasi Asli Indonesia*) (K. Soetardjo, *Desa* [Yogyakarta: Sumur Bandung, 1953]). Joeniarto also identifies it as essentially Indonesian and underlines Soetardjo's proposal that results do not evolve from a counting of votes pro and con, but rather from "a general agreement reached in discussion guided by commonsense." Ibid., p. 113, in R. Joeniarto, *Pemerintahan Lokal* (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Badan Penerbit Gadjah Mada University, 1967), p. 63. Observations of the form used in today's kampung also reveal intense lobbying, cajolery, chicanery, and coercion to be part of the process of achieving consensus.

8. The Sultan issued the related ordinances in July 1912 and July 1917. (See van Mook, "Kuta Gede," p. 321.) The laws became effective in 1918 but were not fully implemented until the late 1920s. (See Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta*, p. 34.) Rural administrative units returned to their pre-1755 territorial-communal form: the *deso* or, in the new terminology, *kalurahan*. These maintained their professional status in that their functionaries were accorded rights to income-producing land (*bengkok*). (Ibid.) They have kept that status to the present day.

New legislation required them to be *approved* by the *assisten wedono*, but there were no other changes in their status or responsibilities.<sup>9</sup>

In 1932, another level was introduced, when the two *assisten* territories were divided into *kemantren*. The *assisten Tugu* now had five *mantri kepala kampung* under him, and the *assisten Kraton* four.<sup>10</sup> The *mantri* were professional bureaucrats, hence the "proper" state system deepened. The status of *kampung* and their functionaries did not change, but candidates for *kepala kampung* were now approved by the *mantri*.<sup>11</sup> The capital's population had passed 100,000 by 1920 and was above 144,000 in 1932, with average population density around 9,730 persons per square kilometer.<sup>12</sup> The *kemantren* level was added to facilitate administration of this growing urban mass.

The 1932 situation prevailed until January 1944, when the Japanese 16th Army revised urban government. There were 190,000 people in the city then and population density was over 12,800 per square kilometer.<sup>13</sup> Yogyakarta's 100 *kampung* became *aza*, replicating similar-sized administrative units in Japanese cities.<sup>14</sup> These were declared, for the first time, to be units of civil government, even though their functionaries were unpaid and informally selected. They were required to have more functionaries than formerly: their chiefs (now termed *azacho*) were expected to acquire deputies and secretarial assistance. A new level of *kampung* government was introduced, as *aza* were divided into small neighborhood blocks called *tonarigumi*, each with its own chief (*tonarigumiyo*) and secretary.<sup>15</sup>

The reform was intended to assist the flagging Japanese war effort. *Aza* officials were called on to maintain civil order, provide diverse data on local populations, and help assemble labor for use in civil and military projects, under pain of severe punishment.<sup>16</sup> The *azacho* remained directly responsible to their *mantri* (*soncho*) who were now accountable to the *bupati kota* (*kencho*).<sup>17</sup> In theory, the latter were under the ultimate control of the *Kraton*.<sup>18</sup>

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9. Poliman, B. A. Suratmin, Muljono, et al. *Sejarah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah-Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta: Departemen P & K, 1977), p. 361.

10. Dipodiningrat, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan," p. 46.

11. Ibid.

12. P. D. Milone, *Urban Areas in Indonesia: Administrative and Census Concepts*, Institute of International Studies Research Series No. 19 (Berkeley: University of California, 1966).

13. Poliman, et al., *Sejarah Daerah Istimewa*, pp. 361-63.

14. Thus, with an average size of 1,900 people, the *aza* and erstwhile *kampung* resembled the traditional *cho* unit of Japanese urban wards (*ku*). Yazaki, *Social Change and the City*, p. 456.

15. During the Meiji Restoration, the old five-household *goningumi* units were abolished but later replaced in urban areas by *tonarigumi* units of five to ten families. Benedict, *Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, p. 57.

16. Personal communications, ex-*aza* functionaries.

17. Dipodiningrat, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan," pp. 46-47.

18. Poliman, et al., *Sejarah Daerah Istimewa*, p. 362.

In August 1945, the Japanese surrendered and Indonesia's independence was proclaimed. Yogyakarta became a Special Region (*Daerah Istimewa*) of the new Republic, while remaining a Sultanate. Its capital city was divided into two *kabupaten*, whose heads (*bupati*) presided over twelve *kemantren*, each containing nine to twelve *kampung* units. Those units were now called *rukun kampung*.<sup>19</sup>

Through 1945-47, several directives refined and elaborated the RK. These established *kampung* management committees (*pengurus harian RK*) and replaced *tonarigumi* with new neighborhood associations (*rukun tetangga*, RT). These also installed six social-functional sections (*bagian*) in every RK to deal with internal security, women's affairs, youth affairs, social welfare, economic problems, general administrative and developmental matters.<sup>20</sup> Precise rules now governed the election of *kampung* functionaries, their terms of office, duties, and responsibilities.<sup>21</sup> *Kampung* leadership had the same general obligations as the *azacho* and, among other things, had to take a larger part in state tax and information gathering, supervise the activities of the *bagian*, and help extend urban infrastructure. Nevertheless, despite significant contributions to municipal, regional, and national government, the RK-RT remained outside the state sphere as legally defined; that still ended at *kemantren* level.

In 1947, the Sultan's capital became an "autonomous municipality"—*Haminte Kota Yogyakarta*, and RK-RT affairs the concern of municipal government.<sup>22</sup> Legislation abolished the two *kabupaten* and united their *kemantren* under a mayor (*walikota*) and People's Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Haminte Kota*).<sup>23</sup> Two new *kemantren* were added (*Umbulharjo* and *Kotagede*), giving the city its present complement of fourteen *kemantren* and area of 3,247 hectares.

19. Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta*, pp. 60, 361.


20. The *bagian* was the one novel Republican contribution to *kampung* structure. Each organized (usually in the interests of one or more Central Government Ministry) a significant social grouping or function.

21. *Bupati Paniradya Ajahan-Umum, Bagian Pamong Pradja dan Rukun-Tetangga, Petundjuk No. 12, 1.11.45* (hereafter BPAU 12/1945); *Bupati Paniradya Pati, Petundjuk dari Djawatan Pradja Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta No. 23/DP-1946*; Hal Pembahasan Pengurus Rukun-Tetangga dan Rukun-Kampung (hereafter BPP 23/1946); *Bupati Paniradya Pati, Petundjuk dari Djawatan Pradja Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta No. 12 A/D P.1947*, Lampiran I, Hal: "Rukun Kampung"; Lampiran II, "Peraturan Ronda Kampung Seluruh Kota Yogyakarta" (hereafter BPP 12/1947).

22. Dipodiningrat, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan," p. 48.

23. The Mayor was responsible to the Special Region's head (the Sultan) for the city's operation. The regional chief was responsible to the Minister of Internal Affairs (*Menteri Dalam Negeri*). Subsequent legislation (in 1948 and 1950) defined the Special Region as a First Level Regional Government (*Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I*) and the city as a Second Level Regional Government (*PD Tingkat II*). Both had People's Representative Assemblies (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*) to initiate legislation. These elected legislatures do not control or run the respective regions (as would be the case in the United States and Australia) and members of the Level II (Municipal) Assemblies do not represent wards or precincts. Then and now, the city formed one electoral district. From twenty to forty candidates are elected to its Assembly on the basis of one to every 10,000 residents. *Sekretaria Daerah, Kotamadya, HUT Ke 22 Kotamadya Jogjakarta* (Yogyakarta: Sekretariat DPRDGR, 1969), pp. 8-9.

Diagram 1. *Rukun Kampung*--Typical Organizational Structure According to State Instructions and Recommendations



In early September 1965, the city was declared a *kotamadya* ("middle-sized city"), which brought no changes in *kemantren* or RK government. In 1974, *kemantren* were renamed *kecamatan* (areas under the control of *camat*). This was the last national legislation to have any notable effect on local government in Yogyakarta to the end of my research sojourn. Indeed, its RK have remained fundamentally unchanged since the mid-1940s.<sup>24</sup> We should review their present structure in more detail.

In conformity with national, regional, and municipal directives, each RK has three interlocking sets of offices:

- (i) A central executive, styled "pengurus inti RK" ("core RK executive") or "pengurus harian RK" ("RK daily management committee"). It is prescribed that each have at least three officers: an RK chief (*ketua umum*), secretary (*sekretaris*), and treasurer (*bendahara*). But a seven-member "pengurus" is strongly recommended, with the addition of first and second deputy chiefs (*wakil-ketua RK I & II*), an assistant secretary (*sekretaris RK II*), and assistant treasurer (*bendahara RK II*).

24. The Municipal Government continued to make small revisions of its administration system through the 1970s. The last, while I was in the field, was Mayoral Decision No. 27, March 1979, which initiated minor changes in local election procedures. The brief account of the present RK-RT system which follows is informed particularly by the directives: *Peraturan Daerah Kotamadya Yogyakarta* (Regulation of Kotamadya Yogyakarta) No. 7/1970 and *Keputusan Walikota Yogyakarta* (Decision of the Mayor of Yogyakarta) 072/KD/1975.

- (ii) A set of six functional sections (*seksi*), each with its own *pengurus*. The sections cover kampung security (*seksi keamanan*); social welfare (*seksi sosial*); kampung development projects (*seksi pembangunan*); information services and education (*seksi penerangan dan pendidikan*); women's affairs (*seksi wanita*); youth affairs (*seksi pemuda*).

All officials are elected from stringently qualified candidates approved by the *camat*. Only certain persons may vote in *pengurus* RT-RK elections: the *anggota* RK--household heads who are Indonesian citizens registered to the respective RK.

The primary election is for RT chiefs. Candidates must be *anggota* RK, 25 years of age or older, residents of the respective RT for at least three months, and free of involvement in "The Thirtieth of September Movement" (*Gestapu*) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This election is critical, because the RT chiefs as a group strongly influence RK-wide elections. A meeting of the new RT chiefs decides the list of candidates to be approved by the *camat* for *pengurus* RK positions. Under the guidance of the *ketua* RT, *anggota* elect an elector for every ten households (*somah*) in their RT. Those electors create the new *pengurus* harian RK. After the elections, RT and section leaders are responsible to the RK executive, which is accountable to the *camat*.

According to municipality instructions, all public utterances, notices, and letters by RT committees and officers must be issued through the *pengurus* RK. All RT decisions must be validated by the *pengurus* RK.

All plans and policies developed by the sections must go to the *pengurus* RK for approval before they may be implemented.

All official RK letters and documents must pass through the *camat*'s office. The *pengurus* RK must seek the *camat*'s approval before implementing any money-making plans, or any plans for RK work involving money outlays. When such plans are approved by the *camat*, proper accounts must be kept ready for inspection by *kecamatan* officers at short notice.

RK governments carefully observe these formalities, so the official picture outlined gives a fair idea of actual RK organization in Yogyakarta. However, to develop the explanation of their normal functioning we must examine the communal aspect.

### *Kampung as Communities*

As a *de facto* administrative unit, the RK is a territory and set of offices. In Yogyakarta, the word "kampung" embraces those ideas for the majority of urban dwellers--"the little people" or *wong cilik*--but to them, it means more than that. They interpret it as "community" and identify themselves as "kampung persons" or *wong kampung* with that thought in mind.

There are 163 RK in Kotamadya Yogyakarta, spread across fourteen subdistricts. My research focused on the fourteen RK of one central subdistrict (identified in this text as Kecamatan V). The richest data came from the RK in which I lived, but I also gathered considerable information from the other thirteen. The evidence indicated that for each RK in the Kotamadya there was a corresponding kampung community as described below.

The kampung represents an urban variant of the traditional *gotong royong* mode of social organization developed in Javanese farming communities over many centuries. The expression "gotong royong" (literally, "to share a burden") is



usually translated as "mutual cooperation." The related system of communality is based on labor sharing in agricultural production. The mature system is a complex of economic and cultural practices, ideals, values, ethics, and social sanctions, all ordered around the concept of neighborly cooperation.<sup>25</sup>

It is perhaps best known as a set of "classical practices." In the seminal study of those classics, Koentjaraningrat identified seven major types, requiring substantial neighborly cooperation in: (i) times of family bereavement and other calamities; (ii) community work projects; (iii) the preparation and celebration of *slametan*; (iv) the system associated with upkeep of ancestral graves; (v) building of and major repairs to houses; (vi) certain phases of agricultural production; (vii) certain activities connected with ". . . the duty of the *kuli* class to contribute manpower for the benefit of the community."<sup>26</sup>

Type (iv) does not apply to local *kampung*, as they do not maintain graveyards nor look back to real or fictive founding ancestors. Type (vi) has no direct relevance because *wong kampung* are not agriculturalists. Type (vii) applies, even though there is no recognized *kuli* (landholding) class in the urban setting. Types (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) apply without qualification. *Kampung* people generally equate the seven types with the highest *gotong royong* ideals and activities. They are *their* "classics" too. Nonetheless, the system can be observed to permeate all spheres of *kampung* life.

Where better-off urbanites typically pursue their private lives within the confines of their immediate families, *wong kampung* do so within clusters of close neighbors. These clusters represent the basic "cells" of the *kampung* organism. They function rather like closely knit families. On average, they contain five to six households, yet they provide their members with the kinds of close personal support that the nuclear family is reputed to offer.<sup>27</sup>

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25. Several writers have analyzed *gotong royong* patterns in Javanese farming communities, including the following: B. ter Haar, *Adat Law in Indonesia* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948); Soetardjo, *Desa*; R. M. Koentjaraningrat, *Some Social Anthropological Observations on Gotong Royong Practices in Two Villages in Central Java* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1961); Robert Jay, *Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969); and K. Sartono, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java," in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Claire Holt, et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). More recently, others have reported on similar patterns in urban settings, among them: R. Abdulgani, "My Childhood World," *Indonesia* 17 (April 1974): 113-36; A. Karamoy and A. Sablie, "Aspek dan Pengaruh Komunikasi pada Pemuda di Kampung Miskin Kota Jakarta," *Prisma* 3 (1975); G. F. Papanek, "The Poor of Jakarta," *Prisma* 3 (1976); M. G. Logsdon, "Neighborhood Organization in Jakarta," *Indonesia* 18 (October 1974): 53-70; and H. D. Evers, "Subsistence Production and the Jakarta 'Floating Mass,'" *Prisma* 17 (1980). It is worth remarking that none of the latter confronted urban contexts quite as traditionally Javanese as the court city of Yogyakarta.

26. Koentjaraningrat, *Some Social Anthropological Observations*, p. 29.

27. In studying these neighborly clusters I drew heavily on data and relationships developed by my wife, Norma Sullivan. At the time, she was collecting ethnographic data on our home *kampung* as part of her doctoral research. Cell life is female-centered and female-managed: males make important physical and mental inputs, and enjoy cell support, but it is the women's unceasing work and organizational efforts which form the lifeblood of these small groups. For details of their

Table 1. Population Density per RK, Kecamatan V--June 30, 1979

RK Number	Population	Area (Hectares)	Number of Persons per Square Kilometer
1	2,973	8.5	34,976
2	1,509	5.0	30,180
3	1,450	5.0	29,000
4	2,918	8.0	36,475
5	2,115	8.0	26,438
6	1,266	8.0	15,825
7	1,876	8.0	23,450
8	746	5.0	14,920
9	3,588	9.0	39,867
10	1,948	6.5	29,969
11	1,259	5.0	25,180
12	1,015	6.5	15,615
13	1,547	7.5	20,615
14	1,392	9.0	15,467
	25,602	99.00	25,861

Sources: Kantor Kecamatan and RK Records; Biro Statistik, Kotamadya Yogyakarta.

Though each RK has a name, I identify those of Kecamatan V by the numbers 1-14, for reasons of confidentiality. Our base RK is number 12 in the set. The figures in Tables 1-2 describe certain key features of the environment in which cells and related groupings operate.

There is a rather wide variation in RK size and amenity but space is at a premium in all: the available land is densely settled in every RK and houses are typically very crowded. A great many household chores, and the vast majority of in-cell activities, are undertaken outside houses in the public spaces of the *gang* or alleyways.<sup>28</sup>

internal organization, see John Sullivan, *Back Alley Neighbourhood: Kampung as Urban Community in Yogyakarta*, CSEAS Working Paper No. 18 (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, 1980); and John Sullivan, "Rukun Kampung and Kampung: State-Community Relations in Urban Yogyakarta" (Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1982). Fuller anthropological accounts of kampung composition and structuring are presented in Norma Sullivan, "A Female Version of Slametan," *Australian Indonesian Association Journal* [Melbourne] (1983); Norma Sullivan, "Masters and Managers in Sitiwaru: Men and Women in a Yogyakarta Urban Kampung" (Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1983); Norma Sullivan, "Indonesian Women in Development: State Theory and Urban Kampung Practice," in *Women's Work and Women's Roles: Economics and Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore*, Development Studies Centre Monograph No. 32 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1983). My wife's participation in daily cell activities and warm relations with female neighbors paved the way for me to investigate facets of cell life which otherwise would have been closed or invisible to a male researcher.

28. As Clifford Geertz has explained for another urban area (*The Social History of an Indonesian Town* [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969]), kampung typically occupy *marginal* land off the main thoroughfares where "the big people" or *wong gede* locate their residences, businesses, offices, and so on. Accordingly, the

Table 2. Kecamatan V--Families, Persons, and Houses--June 30, 1979

RK Number	Number of Families	Number of Houses	Mean - Families to House	Mean Size Family (Members)	Mean - Persons to House
1	638	283	2.25	4.66	10.50
2	327	159	2.06	4.61	9.49
3	298	204	1.48	4.87	7.11
4	614	374	1.64	4.75	7.80
5	392	264	1.48	5.40	8.01
6	264	194	1.36	4.80	8.53
7	353	140	2.52	5.31	13.40
8	149	104	1.43	5.00	7.17
9	782	428	1.83	4.59	8.38
10	411	165	2.49	4.74	11.81
11	313	158	1.98	4.02	7.97
12	274	138	1.99	3.70	7.36
13	357	183	1.95	4.33	8.45
14	287	190	1.51	4.85	7.33
	5,459	2,984	1.83	4.69	8.58

Sources: Kantor Kecamatan V; own notes and calculations.


Map 1 indicates roughly the location of, and area covered by, cells studied in Kecamatan V. In my base, RK 12, I identified twenty-one distinct clusters. Three of these (that containing our landlady's household and two closely allied to it) were studied in depth throughout the research sojourn. The other eighteen were less open to sustained investigation but their nature, membership, and characteristic functions were identified. The twenty-one cells accounted for 126 of the RK's 274 families (46 percent). Average cell size was six households; nineteen cells fell into a range of three to nine households; one cell embraced twelve households, and one exceptionally large one, nineteen households. Five cells were distinguished and studied in the adjoining RK 13; four in RK 4; three in RK 7; two each in RK 2, 10, 11, and 14; and one each in RK 5, 6, and 9. In the remaining three RK (1, 3, 8) I did not form the close contacts needed to advance this kind of inquiry successfully. My main conclusions are based on this small sample, particularly that part of it within RK 12 where the underlying system became apparent in the movements of comparatively large numbers of its cells.

Within the cells, neighbors pool and divide labor to accomplish diverse tasks: household chores, home repairs, child minding, caring for the sick and disabled, shopping, and much else. They share all manner of scarce resources: cash, food, clothing, tools, furniture, and so on, in a continuous process of lending and borrowing.<sup>29</sup> These transactions can be seen as rational responses to bitter need,

great bulk of each RK's population is packed into the space behind the buildings fronting its bordering streets. Those inner spaces are criss-crossed by narrow walkways (*gang*). No vehicles may be ridden or driven on the *gang*.

29. An apt example of the system's efficiency is the (many times repeated) case where several families own and share "one complete kitchen." One cell member may have the best space for food preparation as well as a bench and set of knives. Another may own a large wok and long-handled spatulas. Yet another may contribute the main oil range plus several saucepans. By cooking collectively and/or staggering preparation times, the full kit of kitchen equipment can be made to serve the everyday needs of twenty and more people.

Map 1. Kecamatan V--Cells Studied: Scale 1:6500



but purely economic explanations are misleading. Material sharings go hand in hand with a sharing of human warmth, hopes, fears, sorrows, and joys. It is within these groups that emotions are permitted fairly free play, without risk of normal social censure. Members quarrel, criticize and abuse each other, entertain and comfort each other, depending on mood and need. In its totality, this sphere of everyday cooperation seems perfectly consistent with the gotong royong tradition exemplified in the classic practices. It appears to be informed by quite the same values and ideals.

It should be emphasized that these kinds of relations and activities do not involve every family in the RK. Although all registered residents of the Kotamadya are members of rukun kampung, not all are kampung members. This can be explained largely in class terms. The gotong royong system represents a lower-class tradition originating among a feudal peasantry. Its ideals are much enunciated in official and elite circles but, as a practical way of life, it pertains only to wong cilik. The wong gede simply do not need the kinds of support offered by the kampung, its cells, and related associations. Most of them have come to believe that kampung ways are backward and distasteful. Table 3 displays some relevant income strata for Kecamatan V. Plainly, the majority of families are quite poor: almost 70 percent earned less than US\$64 per month in mid-1979. While not an infallible rule, the US\$160 per month mark serves as a fair borderline between kampung and non-kampung income earners. It is extremely rare for a kampung family to earn that much in any one month. So, by this criterion, roughly 16 percent of the RK's families are not kampung members.

According to Indonesian town planners, the kecamatan's RK represent "Type B residential areas": i.e., large city blocks, with generally good quality brick buildings along their bordering streets, and the housing of the urban poor crammed into the large "pockets" behind those buildings. Most buildings on the fringes of RK are inhabited by wong gede. Indeed, in kampung parlance, the opposite to wong kampung is wong gedongan: loosely "the people of the buildings outside the kampung." Despite certain conflicting facts, kampung people insist that all such folk are rich. (Comparison of Tables 3 and 4 discloses a flaw in the contention: e.g., 976 families reside on the fringes but only 894 earn in excess of US\$160 per month.)<sup>30</sup>

It should be added that the local Chinese are not wong kampung: 16-18 percent of Kecamatan V's families are Chinese: most earn more than US\$160 per month and dwell on RK fringes.

In summary, about 80 percent of the subdistrict's people are wong kampung. The situation is slightly confused by the presence of a minority of poor, Javanese residents who are not kampung members. These include new arrivals, transients, and others who, for various reasons, have not embraced or been embraced by the corresponding communities. We should now consider more carefully the state's role in forming and sustaining these gotong royong communities.

### *Community-RK Connections*

The RT (Rukun Tetangga) is the most significant focus and regulator of communal relations. It functions to form the neighborly "cells" into larger cohesive

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30. In fact, there are some fine stone buildings and wealthy families well inside the "pockets," as well as some poor wooden structures and poor families located long the kecamatan's major thoroughfares. Still, the generalization holds up fairly well, and kampung people canvass it to boost their view of themselves as "insiders" to the wong gedongan "outsiders."

Table 3. Monthly Family Income, Kecamatan V--June 30, 1979--Converted to American Dollars from Rupiah at June 30, 1979 Rate (1:780)

RK Number	Number of Families Earning Per Month						Total Families
	Under 32	32.00- 64.00	64.01- 96.00	96.01- 128.00	128.01- 160.00	Over 160.00	
1	248	218	28	20	3	121	638
2	169	94	25	12	5	22	327
3	78	78	35	5	-	102	298
4	244	177	59	12	2	120	614
5	143	110	25	5	-	109	392
6	66	68	33	17	-	80	264
7	85	117	63	48	14	26	353
8	32	57	20	8	5	27	149
9	320	259	55	60	-	88	782
10	209	149	18	8	3	24	411
11	57	141	34	20	6	55	313
12	101	104	20	14	4	31	274
13	108	63	53	30	30	73	357
14	131	123	15	2	-	16	287
Total Families	1,991	1,758	483	261	72	894	5,459
Percentage	36.47	32.20	8.85	4.78	1.32	16.38	100.00

Sources: Kecamatan V/RK Records. Class Intervals and computations John Sullivan.

Table 4. Distribution of Residences and Families Inside and Outside Type B Pockets in Kecamatan V--June 30, 1979

RK Number	Residences			Families		
	Inside	Outside	Percentage Outside	Inside	Outside	Percentage Outside
1	234	49	17.31	528	110	17.24
2	157	2	1.26	323	4	1.22
3	160	44	21.57	234	64	21.48
4	300	74	19.79	493	121	19.71
5	194	70	26.51	288	104	26.53
6	138	56	28.87	188	76	28.79
7	109	31	22.14	307	46	13.03
8	65	39	37.50	93	56	37.58
9	336	92	21.50	644	138	17.85
10	151	14	8.48	390	21	5.11
11	125	33	20.89	248	65	20.77
12	115	23	16.67	228	46	16.79
13	140	43	23.50	292	65	18.21
14	150	40	21.05	227	80	20.91
Total	2,374	610	20.44	4,483	976	17.88

Sources: Residence Totals--Kantor Kecamatan V Records. "Outside" Residences--full count by author and assistants.

groups. To some extent, this reflects an official aim. Local authorities recommend that RT incorporate ten to twelve families (*Peraturan RKY 7/1970*). The number is chosen with an official eye to *lingkungan dan keramah-tamahan*: "neighborhood and neighborship."<sup>31</sup> Most Yogyakarta RT have grown past this level: few now contain less than twenty households. Nonetheless, the legislation's apparent intent has been successful: it has helped establish neighborhood associations which, though several times larger than the single family, are still small enough to retain some "familial" characteristics. Jay has shown that, in Javanese rural areas, proximity per se is a significant factor in group formation, in that families tend to define and celebrate associations of those living close enough to be able to render prompt assistance in emergencies.<sup>32</sup> This appears to apply just as well in urban settings.

RT group relations are cooler and more formal than those within the clusters. Following Jay's lead, I monitored attendance at family slametan--the classic practices of Type (iii) (see above, p. 71). While in no case a perfect fit, participation was markedly RT-focused. In each instance, the majority of RT kampung women worked to prepare the ritual feast (i.e., performed *rewang*) and all RT kampung households were invited to send adult male representatives to the formal celebration (*kenduri*).<sup>33</sup> The RT group always formed the core but, depending on the wealth of the host family and slametan aims, varying numbers of people from outside the focal RT could perform *rewang* and *kenduri*.

Where the clusters cannot assemble adequate support for members in calamitous situations and in larger home-repair or building projects, they turn next to cells of their own RT. Accordingly, many classic practices of Types (i) and (v) are RT-focused. Where cell support tends to be taken for granted, and is sought and given without any formality, RT support is always very formally requested and provided.

It is not by chance or simply because of their size that RT act as foci for such practices. State authorities strive to promote pride in RT association and intensify RT group solidarity. Many inter-RT competitions are organized to this end: sporting and cultural contests; competitions to stimulate greater achievement of state-defined targets in areas of tax contributions, acceptance of family-planning methods, RK cleanliness, sanitation, and infrastructural improvements. These activities bring clusters together fairly often in RT-specific meetings, teams, and work gangs. They must also come together frequently in the normal running of RT and RK. Much of the day-to-day administrative work of the RK is performed by, and/or through, pengurus RT, with additional labor drawn as required from the functionaries' nearest neighbors. RT can initiate projects to benefit their members, to raise funds, provide entertainment, and extend neighborhood social capital. Large projects of wider community interest (requiring gotong royong cooperation of Types (ii) and (vii)) are often tackled by work teams formed on RT

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31. The Japanese originally required tonarigumi to comprise five to ten households, in line with the rule in their home cities. The latter rule was made to establish an optimal-size administrative molecule which, though several times larger than a family, was still compact and easily managed by its elders on behalf of the state.

32. Cf. Jay, *Javanese Villagers*, pp. 216-18.

33. The data for these findings were collected in a joint effort, within RK 12, with my wife tallying attendance at the exclusively female preparations and myself covering the exclusively male phase of the ceremonies.

lines and directed by RT leaders, under the overall direction of pengurus inti officials and those of appropriate seksi. The RK nightwatch (*ronda malam*), directed by seksi keamanan, is organized in RT sections, in compliance with municipal regulations. The whole band of activity requires continuous cooperation, which reaffirms the interdependence of close neighbors and the general perception that the RT itself is a communal organ.

The key function of RK executive and seksi seems to be to form RT groups into kampung wholes. These larger bodies are less cohesive than those at RT level. The relations between their component RT groups are cool and highly formal. The formation and maintenance of these wholes are effected almost entirely in classic gotong royong terms.

The practices of Type (vii) are very important at this level. They are linked to urban life by a concept of *kerja bakti* ("duty work"). It is generally thought that all members have a duty to contribute something in return for community membership and support. But it is understood that all cannot and should not contribute equally. There are several levels of membership with varying degrees of responsibility and privilege attaching.<sup>34</sup>

The idea of *kerja bakti* is flexed, and the old rules connected with Type (vii) practices are invoked, in all community work projects planned and supervised by seksi *pembangunan* and the appropriate RT-RK officers. According to an official-communal consensus, all the relevant RT-RK functionaries must perform their specified roles in these practices. Both state and community make it plain that male kepala somah have more pressing obligations than other male non-functionaries to contribute labor, expertise, and related resources. It is axiomatic that all kepala somah (male and female) unable for good reason to participate physically, will either instruct an adult male delegate to do so or fulfill their duty in some other approved fashion (e.g., by contributing an additional sum to defray materials costs or sending refreshments to the worksite).

Since 1970, with this labor, the kecamatan has sunk 106 wells; leveled and paved 78 percent of the district's alleyways; deepened and formed-up 72 percent of its storm drain system; erected eleven community halls (*balai RK*) and performed major renovations on three others; built ten public bathrooms and nine permanent kiosks for kampung traders. The communities have also constructed and/or kept in good repair numerous benches, walls, gates, guardposts, bike racks, and playing areas.<sup>35</sup>

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34. Children and others lacking full adult capacities (e.g., those grossly mentally or physically disabled) are not members, merely kampung dependents. The lowest-level members are unmarried adult females who are not household heads (*kepala somah*), with the males of this general group ranking slightly higher. At the other end of the scale are adult male kepala somah who are parents: they are expected to bear "full" responsibilities and enjoy greater privileges than the lower ranks. As intimated, the ranking is influenced by age, gender, marital status, parenthood, and household position, not by economic criteria.

35. Before 1974, raw materials and other costs involved in such efforts were defrayed by wong kampung, with minor assistance from rich urbanites, aid agencies such as Oxfam, and, spasmodically, government sources. However, since 1974, when the tripling of oil prices made possible a range of new government programs, most funds have been provided by the central government's "Village Assistance Project" (*Bantuan Desa* or *Bandes*) and small, regular subscriptions of RK members



In late 1979, sixteen RK-kampung money-earning projects were operating as communal cooperatives, including a fish-breeding venture, an auto/bicycle repair shop, a leathercraft factory, a tailoring business, and a variety of hire services.

Kampung dwellers view these products as community property. They have been won through community labor and are open to communal use. Ultimately all halls, pathways, drains, playing fields, commercial and cultural enterprises, and so on, are foci of communal sentiment: hard evidence of neighborship. They help to confirm the existence and value of community for each member.

The kampung nightwatch is a traditional model of *kerja bekti*. All adult males must take regular turns. This was made a legal obligation for all male RK residents fifteen years old and over in January 1947, and has been ratified several times since. Those unable to perform the watch pay a set fine to the RK for each breach. The fines received regularly from well-to-do, non-kampung males who never perform, are applied to kampung purposes.

The women's sections (*seksi wanita*) formalize many common communal acts and relations, transforming them into kampung-level events. In theory, all married women of the RK are section members. In practice, it is kampung women who sustain the sections. The most popular services are their credit facilities. These include *arisan*, described by Geertz<sup>36</sup> as "rotating credit associations," a traditional form modified to perform a useful modern function.<sup>37</sup>

The family-planning subsection (*bidang KB-apsari*) is busy, effective, and much-valued. In each kampung, women who have taken short courses in state clinics provide advice and assistance on contraception and family planning. Each subsection organizes the free distribution of medicines and devices supplied by the state. By late 1979, five of the kecamatan's *seksi wanita* ran infant health centers. In these, babies were weighed, examined for common ailments, and medicated. New and expectant mothers were advised on childcare and nutrition, and offered pre- and post-natal advice by women of their own kampung. All RK in the kecamatan have kindergartens (*taman kanak-kanak*) directed by the women's sections. All but one employ paid infant teachers. Being a popular RK-level organ, *seksi wanita* operates effectively for the whole. Its successes confirm the value of general community membership and its normal activities bring women from all cells and RT together quite often, which helps perpetuate kampung relations *per se*.

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to their development sections. The state contribution in 1979 was Rp.400,000 ( $\pm$  US\$640) per RK; local residents supplemented this with amounts averaging Rp.96,000 ( $\pm$  US\$154) per RK in the kecamatan. At the same time, each RK paid back on average Rp.243,151 ( $\pm$  US\$389) in the main tax collected by the Kotamadya (*Ipeda--Iuran Pembangunan Daerah*).

36. Clifford Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association. A 'Middle Rung' in Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10 (1962): 3.

37. Participants pay a set amount into group kitties at monthly intervals. At each (monthly) *seksi wanita* meeting a name is drawn lottery style, and the lucky one takes out a sum equivalent to a full set of individual subscriptions, less a small operating charge. Basically, the *arisan* is a form of compulsory saving but all winners except the last in the sequence are securing interest-free loans of varying amounts. Winners' names are eliminated from the lottery as they win, but all must keep up their subscriptions until the sequence finishes. (Sadly, all do not observe this rule, which prompts some fierce squabbles.)

The RK chiefs' prescribed responsibilities include the organization of, and participation in, classic gotong royong activities. They are obliged to arrange communal assistance in all instances falling within Koentjaraningrat's Type (i) (support for the bereaved, etc.). They are bound also to officiate in the slametan of their communities and bear ultimate responsibility for adequate performance of Type (ii) (community projects) and Type (vii) kerja bakti practices.

Assisted by the seksi sosial head and RT chiefs, the RK chief must ensure that money is collected across the RK to assist those hit by calamities, and that residents provide appropriate assistance to very poor kampung families. The amounts collected are small, and the assistance solicited would be forthcoming from cell and neighborhood without the leader's intervention. However, the gestures are deeply appreciated by the community.

RK chiefs are invited to all slametan held in their territories. They appear at as many as they can and submit ornate but plausible apologies when they cannot. In fact, they miss very few. (In one busy week, our chief attended thirty-two slametan and twelve RK meetings.)

Each year brings several RK-oriented celebrations. A prime example is the annual *tirakatan*, a special slametan which celebrates the rukun kampung itself. In reality, it is a celebration of kampung community. The main work is performed by the women's sections, in RT teams. The RK chief presides, surrounded by pengurus inti members and section leaders. RT chiefs and their assistants sit with their neighborhood groups. Tirakatan is held in the week preceding Independence Day (August 17).

The most active displays of kampung spirit occur in RK beautification exercises. These precede major public holidays and visits by high officials. They draw big crowds. Attendance is heavily sanctioned, but kampung populations attend with great goodwill, normally in their RT groupings. The tidying and decorating work is never onerous, neighbors relish the opportunity to parade their cooperativeness, and the whole process is normally entertaining. During these preparations and on The Great Days themselves, gotong royong sentiments are lavishly bandied about, by wong kampung, RK functionaries, and visiting dignitaries.

The RK leaders' gotong royong contributions are more symbolic than substantial, yet kampung people rate them as the finest examples of the ancient tradition. Greater numbers participate in RK ceremonies and higher levels of formality prevail. The leaders' presence, the large congregations, and the attendant formality give these occasions great significance. When involved in them, wong kampung generally feel pleased and proud of their community membership. Although the associated relations are comparatively shallow, quite enough happens at the RK level to maintain the integrity of the matching kampung.

This is by no means a comprehensive coverage of the kampung form and the support it draws from the RK-RT system, but it should suffice to clarify the central argument. These communities depend heavily on elements provided by the state, including their well-defined territories, the massing of their memberships on those spaces, their most efficient organizational tools, and several essential ideological inputs (e.g., certain gotong-royong symbols and official-ritual forms). The details of the account indicate that the Indonesian state works purposively and with no little skill to foster community by these means. But it is also clear that it inherited the kampung it now fosters in Yogyakarta and with them the bulk of the administrative apparatus supporting them. Before commenting further on the present state's efforts and intentions we should examine the modern kampung's antecedents and the contributions of preceding states.

### *The Kampung in Times Past*

Much of the kampung's past must remain unknown, due to the absence of detailed data. Given the accepted rural origins and great age of gotong royong ways in Java, we can expect that the basic materials for urban community arrived with the city's first settlers. But for a very long period following first settlement there is no evidence at all concerning the development of kampung community as such, whatever apt materials and conditions we might suppose to exist within the capital. Our lack of information is due largely to the way in which kampung were perceived by the kingdom's earliest rulers and chroniclers. Even were they at all interested in the lives of the urban populace and had noticed signs of community development, they would have been unlikely to report on kampung-community correlations.

Due to its close associations with the realm's most prestigious objects and personages, the word kampung would not have been freely associated with wong cilik activities, while those associations endured. As time passed, many kampung lost their original functions and attendant direct relationship to the palace, becoming, in fact, simply residential areas.<sup>38</sup> By the late nineteenth century, the city housed many new kampung which had never been anything else but quarters for the urban poor. Nevertheless, in describing the city's life in that epoch, local historians still made no reference to kampung as wong cilik communities; most continued to allude to them solely in terms of their accepted palace-functional identities.<sup>39</sup>

By 1905, nogoro population was 80,000,<sup>40</sup> and it covered about 1,484 ha.<sup>41</sup> Thus, with a population density of some 5,400 per square kilometer, its kampung were no doubt well filled with lower-class Javanese, presumably following their preferred communal ways of life. In 1918, kampung lost their old functional status and were officially identified as territorial-residential units. The event may have affected elite perceptions of local kampung but it did not produce any new chronicles of their internal lives and social ordering.

Also in 1918, the European Quarter shifted into the Dutch "Newtown" (Kota-baru). Officially, this was a new kampung, but it was not identified as such by its inhabitants. For them it was the *Europeesche Wijk*: The European Quarter. The Colonialists tended to interpret kampung as "native quarter," meaning a slum-like settlement with marked rustic characteristics.<sup>42</sup> This is interesting for two

38. Kasto, *Pertambahan Penduduk Kotamadya Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada Lembaga Kependudukan, 1976); Poliman, et al., *Sejarah Daerah Istimewa*.

39. Dipodiningrat, "Sejarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan"; Darmosugito, "Sedjarah Kota Yogyakarta"; Selo Soemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta*.

40. Milone, *Urban Areas in Indonesia*.

41. Kasto, *Pertambahan Penduduk*.

42. Karsten, for example, refers to kampung in that vein in his report on local town development:

"... the population of the towns, and more especially the masses, who are still three-quarters agrarian in their thinking and their needs, are not yet participating with a full will in urban life, but rather attempt to find expression for their rustic simplicity within an

reasons. First, it credited these urban quarters with traditional communal ways (part of their perceived "rustic" character). Second, the "slum" allusion aligns with the way in which upper-class Yogyanese have come to identify *kampung communities*. While hardly strong evidence of urban communality, these references bring the topic into the historical record. But what can be said about it for the long period prior to 1918?

It must be assumed that the city accommodated such communities well before that date. There are no grounds to believe that traditional ways of life had not reached the capital before then, nor that their bearers lacked the need and motivation to apply them, more or less as they do today. It would appear too, that the basic administrative conditions which today so obviously structure urban communities, were already well in place by 1918. The Sultans' *kampung* had, for many decades, pressed large numbers of *wong cilik* into close proximity on well-defined small territories and provided acceptable community leaders and related foci for neighborly sentiment and cooperative practice.

The first direct references to *kampung* communality per se relate to the period after 1932 when urban *kemantren* were established. Dipodiningrat<sup>43</sup> describes the *kampung* of that era as "community organizations operating in the social field (mutual cooperation in matters pertaining to deaths, marriages, and so on)." The description is borne out by the recollections of older residents. All indicated that their communities then had much the same character they have today. Each explained the pre-War situation in glowing *gotong royong* terms, insisting, however, that people were more neighborly then, and *kampung* life more selflessly communal. As one elderly lady said:

too *individuil* [individualistic] these young ones: you can see them adding up what they can get from their neighbors if they help them. They don't *just help* anymore, and they don't want to help others very much or often. They are "spoilt" [*manja*] now . . . very lazy and only thinking of themselves . . . like young children.

These informants offered considerable detail on classic *gotong royong* practice in those times. Women tended to focus on different types of events from men. Female informants enjoyed spinning elaborate accounts of particular efforts to console the bereaved, honor the dead, and celebrate the living at countless births, circumcisions, and marriages. Males generally concentrated on notable efforts to improve the physical environment and preserve communal calm.

Similar reports were offered with respect to the Japanese Occupation period. *Kampung* members, I was informed, became even more neighborly in response to heightened hardship, with everyone closing ranks against the new overlords. These claims, too, were illustrated with a wealth of anecdotal material concerning *gotong royong* events and relations.

The problem with this kind of historical research in the *kampung* is as follows. Firmly structured interviews with direct questions tend to be self-defeating.

urban setting." (T. Karsten, "Town Development in the Indies" [1920], in *The Indonesian Town*, ed. Wertheim, p. 65.)

He concludes that while "vigorous urbanization" was "cutting straight across their negative mentality," the latter attempt by the masses was diverting the urbanizing impetus into the development of slums. (Ibid.)

43. "Sedjarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan," p. 47.

Javanese politeness, neighborly goodwill, and the assumed direction of the questions themselves, guide most respondents to answers intended to please more than inform. When there is little or no structure, reports on bygone days flow in all directions. The resultant anecdotes are usually conditioned by an urge to canvass kampung ideals and highlight the neighborliness of the teller.

The information so gleaned has serious limitations, but it is not worthless. It fills out some of the history of existing kampung and explains something about their internal cohesion. It confirms that for many decades, each kampung administrative entity in the locality had a matching community, ordered essentially in gotong royong mode.

The existence of stable neighborly clusters (which receives little if any endorsement today) was strongly denied by older informants for the 1930s and 1940s. There seem to be two facets to these denials. In the first place, the humble "cell" is not conceived a legitimate gotong royong association, due mainly to its size and the informality of its relations. But worse, in the light of high neighborly ideals, these small groups can appear cliquey and divisive. My view that they are necessary elements of a higher unity was just not acceptable; the elderly, in particular, saw the proposition as implying serious breaches in kampung unity. My critics were not denying absurdly that they spend most of their time in the company of close neighbors who provide constant support. They were resisting the idea that these everyday relations take place within highly stable, determinate groupings: they preferred to depict them as more diffused, very fluid, and without import in the genuinely communal scheme of things.

Discussions concerning tonarigumi-RT groupings were generally freer and more fruitful. The RT was rated a crucial part of kampung government and nobody denied that the tonarigumi was its model. All reports indicated that the latter operated much like its successor and that kampung relations to it were essentially the same. Both units were acknowledged as special hubs of gotong royong sentiment and performance.

No one acknowledged the existence of any similar-sized communal groups prior to the formation of tonarigumi. All insisted, however, that the practices typically focused on the RT had been performed in the kampung for as long as they could remember. Jay's studies and my own observations suggest that those practices invariably involve determinate groups. Perhaps, as with the "cells," my neighbors would not freely recognize such groups because they too would have lacked official formality and smacked of "cliqueness." Still, judged by contemporary RT activities, it seemed that tonarigumi had brought a sharper focus and heightened order to this area of kampung affairs. This appeared most significant because practices and relations at this level evidently play an essential role in the kampung's social circuitry. They function, apparently, to link the ceaseless, rich, informal interchanges of cell life to the infrequently activated, coolly formal relations typical of the RK level. However, my formulation was not warmly endorsed by kampung neighbors. Of course, I may be in error, but this is my thesis, based on participant observation and evidence not limited solely to direct reports. Accordingly (with no little arrogance perhaps) I try to *explain* my informants' opposition to my views of their world. Besides not wishing to honor the cell notion, for reasons outlined above, one and all resisted the idea of a *kampung divided into different levels of neighborhood, which needed to be linked together by some effort*. This too clashed with their most comforting conceptions of community as a seamless, warmly supportive, gotong royong universe.

Elderly informants also praised kampung chiefs of the 1930s and 1940s. The consensus was that they had two paramount responsibilities, which all shouldered

admirably: (a) ensuring that gotong royong was practiced in correct form on the widest scale possible; (b) acting for their communities in dealings with the non-kampung world. A propos the latter, several people told stories about aza officials who defended their kampung against Japanese excesses. These recalled instances in which azacho passed false information to higher offices, ignored or otherwise vitiated state directives, and refused to locate or hand over individuals wanted by other authorities. The stories celebrated the community leaders' classical "buffering role," itself a much-revered theme in gotong royong discourse. While I did not doubt that there was some truth in each story, I suspected that the general effectiveness and heroism of azacho were exaggerated.

It must be considered that the various exaggerations and glosses suspected in many reports are not simply products of nostalgia, failing memory, or self-interest. The older generation also has a responsibility to promote the ideals of neighborliness. Thus, many kampung stories about the past take on the form of parables exemplifying neighborly virtues. This can also affect accounts of current events, but critical details of these can often be checked with numbers of other witnesses and/or against firsthand observations. Generally, too, fresh reports are still relatively unrefined and unembellished.

### Conclusion

The evidence on kampung community for 1930-45, while richer than that for preceding periods, is peculiarly biased and limited to a narrow field of events. Hence, we must still infer a great deal about state impact on urban community in that era. We may infer that, by the early 1930s, the city's kampung administrative entities were already paired with definite communities. Since the former supplied the latter with their crucial territories, members, and leaders, the state can be credited with a fundamental role in community development. We may not infer, however, that any pre-War authorities aimed for such an outcome.<sup>44</sup>

Japanese authorities seem to have had a general intention to harness urban communalism to state ends: certainly, such was a declared function of tonarigumi in their own cities. But they did not seek specifically to boost gotong royong ways. Indeed, their urban reforms do not appear to have been based on significant prior research or notable concern about existing customs or preferences. Yet several of their initiatives evidently enhanced kampung community.

Arguably, Indonesian authorities have both intended to develop urban communities and been very effective in the process. One can only conclude that they have deliberately and skillfully fostered gotong royong communalism in Yogyakarta, *as an integral part of urban administration*. The basic administrative model received and refined in 1945-47 has been effectively ratified by all subsequent governments. Through Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy, to the present New Order era, state authorities at national, regional, and municipal levels have worked to maintain the RK-kampung connection.

Indonesian denials of the RK's political character differ from those of former governments. For pre-War rulers it was largely a matter of form: their kampung

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44. As noted earlier, Yogyakarta's traditional rulers subscribed to a concept of kampung which had no association with vulgar communities, and the Dutch tended to view such objects as unfortunate relics of the feudal past, not as desired ends for urban administrative endeavors.

units lacked certain formal characteristics considered essential in genuine state-administrative organs. The Japanese included *aza* and *tonarigumi* in prescriptions of the local administrative system, but denied that they were connected with the Japanese state.<sup>45</sup> The Indonesians, however, deny the *kampung*'s political function in order, it would seem, to accentuate and exploit its communal attributes more effectively.

In late 1945, they began to transform the Japanese-enhanced *kampung* into the modern RK unit. Their modifications of the basic form have been relatively small: apart from the introduction of *bagian*, most concern procedural matters. Their most significant single achievement is the official discourse developed for RK-*kampung* affairs. It presents those affairs and attendant state interests in the most favorable communal light, with the apparent aim of facilitating government. Since 1945, state authorities have consistently defined RK in *gotong royong* terms, guided their activities and communicated with their leaders in the same terminology. The approach has sought, successfully it seems, to distance these organs from the rest of the state machinery.

As an instruction from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of June 25, 1947, put it, "*rukun tetangga* and *rukun kampung* are social organizations, which are acknowledged as being helped and protected by the government--not levels or instruments of government."<sup>46</sup> Earlier instructions expressed the same notion and highlighted a converse proposition: that RT and RK existed to help government, not to govern as integral components of the state.<sup>47</sup>

These thoughts have been reiterated in innumerable directives since 1947. A more recent statement by the Mayor of Yogyakarta explains that the RK's basic tasks are twofold: "[to act] as communal institutions aimed at fostering a *gotong royong* spirit appropriate to regulating and fulfilling the social needs of their own members"; secondly, "[w]ithin reasonable limits, to help the regional [city] government in all its activities" (Kep. 072/KD/1974).<sup>48</sup>

The approach helps to confirm the popular conviction that governmental organs within the *kampung* are *community* organs. Hundreds of *kampung* people questioned on the point responded to that effect. There is some truth in the

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45. According to Ruth Benedict (*Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, pp. 57-58) that was not the official attitude in Japan itself, where the rulers viewed *tonarigumi* as *community organs* to be distinguished as such from *state organs*. In Java, however, Japanese authorities adopted a different attitude.

46. Cited in Dipodiningrat, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan," p. 47.

47. BPAU 12/1945; BPP 23/1946; BPP 12/1947.

48. New national legislation affecting the RK-RT system was passed in 1979: *Village Government Law No. 5*. This had not been implemented when I left the field. Its stated aim is to set up in each "village complex" (which embraces RK) the *Lembaga Musyawarah Desa* (LMD: "The Institution of the Village Conference"--described by the Internal Affairs Minister as "an institution for discussion leading to consensus [*lembaga permusyawaratan/permufakatan*]"). This law was expanded in 1980, by a Presidential Decision (28/1980) and a further *Ministerial Instruction* (25/1980). These establish the *Lembaga Ketahan Masyarakat Desa* (LKMD: "The Institute for the Maintenance of Village Community"). None of these edicts promise any change in the substance or structure of the RK-RT system, but are worth mentioning for their new contributions to the ideology of traditional communalism.

conviction, but we must weigh it against the political returns which those organs generate for the state.

At the time of my fieldwork, the local camat's office was staffed by nineteen salaried, full-time employees. These people were responsible to the Kotamadya for the administration of a one square kilometer area with more than 25,000 residents. Leaving aside the thousands of ordinary residents involved each year in unpaid construction, maintenance, sanitation, social welfare, and security work, the RT-RK system expands the camat's paid staff by approximately 1,320 unpaid employees. This is a conservative estimate of RT-RK-seksi functionaries working consistently in the kecamatan, at any one time, on tasks which are part of the camat's administrative responsibilities. Besides maintaining the peace in this crowded area, these unpaid officials accomplish an enormous volume of clerical work, assemble tax monies, disseminate state directives and propaganda, promote programs thought to require mass participation, and register residents, major demographic aggregates, and movements.

Despite this involvement in state affairs, wong kampung identify these officials unequivocally as their community leaders. As such they are perceived as mediators between kampung and state. There is some substance behind the perception but, to an outside observer, it seems to involve a singular delusion.

RK leaders can and do help kampung members in various dealings with the camat's office: acquiring travel permits, business and other licenses, identity papers, and the like. They often reduce community tax burdens by juggling head and house counts and property valuations. In these and other small ways they do "mediate" and "buffer," but these acts should be viewed in the light of more momentous occasions when the state demands fuller and more bitter service from its RK servants. Numerous awful examples emerged in the aftermath of the 1965 Coup.

At the time of the Coup, the Special Region was popularly known as "Socialist Yogyakarta." The PKI had a strong footing in the governments of many inner-city RK where the bulk of the urban proletariat lived. The party's Gerwani (Indonesian Women's Movement) and Pemuda Rakyat (Youth Movement) effectively controlled the area's seksi wanita and seksi pemuda. Generally, a large proportion of the city's poor supported PKI candidates, policies, cultural programs, mass union and related movements. While the Sultan's capital did not experience the level of terror and violence reached in adjacent rural areas, thousands of its wong kampung were arrested. Most arrests occurred within RK, with arresting officers drawing on the assistance of RK functionaries. Many were released soon afterwards, but hundreds were imprisoned. In 1979, the final 400 survivors were returned to the city from Pulau Buru, after thirteen to fourteen years of servitude. The kampung contain numerous reports of imprisoned members being mistreated, tortured, and killed. Hundreds of others have been harassed and hurt in lesser ways since October 1965, because of real and alleged links with Gestapu-PKI. All RK governments are still required to keep lists of returned political prisoners and similar suspects, watch them constantly, and help to constrain their movements and employment opportunities.<sup>49</sup> Given widely ramifying kinship and neighborhood

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49. The lists are adjusted as people die, or are permitted to move to other areas (an uncommon event for those blacklisted). Every RK must submit its list to the camat's office each month. Kecamatan lists are then sent to kabupaten level, and so on, until the monthly national accounting is made of ex-PKI, G30S Tapol (ex-PKI members, people implicated in the September 30, 1965 Movement, and



links, a substantial proportion of Yogyakarta's kampung population has suffered from this sequence of events.

To an outsider, it seems obvious that the RK-RT system operated for the state throughout this tragedy, in so many instances, directly against communities. The communities' traditional leaders had to function in their capacity as de facto state officials. Although there are reports of RK officials trying to protect their kampung, "buffering" was simply not on the state's agenda. Those RK-RT functionaries seen to be unsuited to the political demands of the times were summarily removed. Many were arrested; others were replaced by more suitable candidates in the RK elections of late 1965.<sup>50</sup>

The emerging New Order, it appears, was not concerned to promote cordial state-kampung relations. The period opened in the first few days of October 1965. The series of events beginning in the evening of September 30, 1965 in Jakarta, spread very quickly to Yogyakarta. Arrests were made there in that month, and by the end of it the personnel in RK government positions had been drastically changed. It is impossible to be precise about the length of time in which RK were operating blatantly as "control instruments"--certainly several months, maybe years. Arguably, they have never since returned to the less-oppressive pre-Coup situation. The difficulty in achieving precision resides in the fact that *nobody* concedes that RK as such were ever used against kampung people.

Given the kampung's fatalistic attitude and its apparent incapacity to regulate state usage of RK organs we might ask: does it really matter that its people continue to view those organs as kampung possessions? Certainly it does. If my thesis is valid, then wong kampung are seriously deluded: their proprietary view tends to make them accomplices in their own oppression. Conceivably, were they to change that view, urban government would become more onerous and costly to the state and the present administrative system would need some modification. But therein lies the rub.

The RK-kampung dispensation is no mere political device. Two centuries of governmental and communal activities have developed a complex social order in Yogyakarta's kampung. This frames a preferred way of life for most of the urban populace. As I have tried to show, the administrative inputs are crucial to this

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ex-political prisoners). There are several industries and occupations which listed citizens may not enter: e.g., transport (which may give them too much mobility) and any jobs formerly associated with strong union activity.

50. Several neighbors sorely hurt in the weeks preceding these elections, described how they and other kampung people were threatened personally by military personnel, and frightened into supporting unpalatable candidates. It is not clear, however, that such incidents were the order of the day. It appears that it was unnecessary for the New Order authorities to rig all elections and engage in such specific acts of coercion on a wide scale. The terrifying events which were occurring in the wider society created a climate in which most wong kampung were disposed to form RK governments and install candidates pleasing to the new regime. But, whatever the forces at work, the results of the 1965 RK elections in Kecamatan V must have pleased the new authorities. Eleven of the fourteen newly elected RK chiefs were military or police officers. The other three were civilian government employees. Eight of those elected to this office in 1965 were subsequently voted out. But perhaps it is more instructive to note that six of the *ketua umum* elected at this time, still hold office after four subsequent elections.

order and way of life. If those inputs are rejected, withdrawn, or radically modified, the kampung form could well disintegrate, and with it many valuable supports for the city's people. Failing benign and far-reaching changes elsewhere in the Indonesian polity and economy, the loss of physical and emotional solace is a more certain outcome than any reductions in levels of oppression, exploitation, or "false consciousness."